**Research**

**Working Papers**

**Privacy Preserving Signals.****(with Philipp Strack)**

*R&R, Econometrica*

*Abstract*

A signal is**privacy-preserving**with respect to a collection of**privacy sets**, if the posterior probability assigned to every privacy set remains unchanged conditional on any signal realization. We characterize the privacy-preserving signals for arbitrary state space and arbitrary privacy sets. A signal is privacy-preserving if and only if it is a garbling of a**reordered quantile signal**. These signals are equivalent to couplings, which in turn lead to a characterization of optimal privacy-preserving signals for a decision-maker. We demonstrate the applications of this characterization in the contexts of algorithmic fairness, price discrimination, and information design.**The Economics of Monotone Function Intervals. (with Alex Zentefis)**

*R&R, American Economic Review; EC’ 23*

*Abstract***Informational Intermediation, Market Feedback, and Welfare Losses. (with Wenji Xu)**

**[Online Appendix] [SET Video]**

*R&R, RAND Journal of Economics*

*Abstract***market feedback**(i.e., the extent to which past consumer surplus affects future market bases) increases, welfare may decrease in the Pareto sense.

**Equivalence in Business Models for Informational Intermediaries.**

[TSE Online Seminar]

*Abstract*

**Published and Accepted Papers**

**On the Continuity of Outcomes in a Monopoly Market.**

[Working Paper Version]

*Journal of Mathematical Economics,*2023

*Abstract*

A monopolist with a constant marginal cost faces an arbitrary nondecreasing and upper-semicontinuous demand function on that takes a value in {0,1} outside of a fixed compact interval. This paper derives topological properties of outcomes induced by this monopolist’s optimal pricing problem. Specifically, the monopolist’s optimal profit is continuous in the marginal cost and the demand (under the weak-* topology); the optimal price and output correspondences are upper-hemicontinuous in the marginal cost and the demand; and the consumer surplus is upper (lower)-semicontinuous when the monopolist charges the lowest (highest) optimal price. These results further imply similar topological properties of outcomes in settings that feature either second-degree price discrimination or third-degree price discrimination.**Regulating Oligopolistic Competition. (with Alex Zentefis)**

**[Working Paper Version]**

**Journal of Economic Theory,****2023**

*Abstract***Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and its Consequences**.

**[Online Appendix] [Working Paper Version]**

*American Economic Review,*2022.

*Abstract***quasi-perfect price discrimination**—all the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively.

**Efficient Demands in a Multi-Product Monopoly.**

**[Working Paper Version]**

**Journal of Economic Theory****, 2021.**

Abstract**affine-unit-elastic**. This further reduces the problem of characterizing the efficient frontier to a finite dimensional constraint optimization problem. From this characterization, it follows that deadweight losses are positive even under efficient demands; that both consumer surplus and total welfare are nonmonotonic in cost; and that the monopolist sells at most two distinct quality levels under any efficient market demand.

**Short Notes**

**A Note on Generating Arbitrary Joint Distributions Using Partitions.***Abstract*

** Subsumed Papers**

**Distribution of Posterior Quantiles and Economic Applications.**(Subsumed by “Extreme Points of First-Order Stochastic Dominance Intervals: Theory and Applications”) [VSET Video]

**Gerrymandering and the Limits of Representative Democracy.**(Partly subsumed by”Extreme Points of First-Order Stochastic Dominance Intervals: Theory and Applications”) [Media: Election Law Blog, Yale Insight]

**Informationally Robust Welfare Predictions under Second-Degree Price Discrimination.**(Partly subsumed by “Efficient Demands in a Multi-Product Monopoly”)